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shape electoral cycles: only in presidential regimes is ﬁscal adjustment delayed until after
the elections, and only in proportional and parliamentary systems do social transfers expand
around elections. Several of these empirical regularities are in line with recent theoretical
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1
A recent literature on comparative politics has asked how political institutions might
shape economic policy. In particular, a number of theoretical contributions by economists
predict that electoral rules and political regimes systematically inﬂuence ﬁscal policy
outcomes: see Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a survey. But empirical work is still scant.
Whereas a large and interesting literature discusses how constitutional features of state and
local governments correlate with policy outcomes (see for instance Bohn and Inman, 1996,
Pommerhene, 1990, Feld and Matsusaka, 2000), only a few empirical studies have compared
ﬁscal policy in large samples of countries governed by different electoral rules or political
regime. Some recent exceptions are Poterba and Von Hagen (1999), Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti
and Rostagno (2000), and Persson and Tabellini (1999).
2
Political scientists have done extensive empirical work on comparative politics for a
long time. But their focus has been on political phenomena, such as the number of parties,
the frequency of elections, or the attributes of governments under different constitutions,
and does not touch on ﬁscal policy. Castels (1998) and Lijphart (1999) are among the rare
exceptions, but their analyses are conﬁned to correlations and bivariate regressions, relating
a few economic policy outcomes to constitutional features. As a result, very little is known
about whether and how ﬁscal policy varies across political institutions, particularly when the
analysis is extended to non-OECD countries.
We try to ﬁll this gap. Speciﬁcally, we try to establish some stylized facts regarding the
mapping from electoral rules and political regimes to policy outcomes. We look exclusively at
the effects on ﬁscal policy: the size and composition of government spending and government
deﬁcits. A companion paper (Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi, 2000) studies the incidence of
corruptionacrossdifferent political institutions. Whilesome ofourestimatesaimat direct tests
1 We are gratefulforusefulcommentsfromAlbertoAlesina, Per-AndersEdin, FelixOberholzer-Gee, David
Strömberg, Jakob Svensson, and from participants in seminars at the Bank of England, Berkeley, Bonn, the
EuropeanCentralBank, Stanford,Stockholm, UCL,Uppsala, Warwick,andconferencesinToulouseandLugano.
We would also like to thank Christina Lönnblad for editorial assistance and Gani Aldashev, Alessia Amighini,
Thomas Eisensee, Giovanni Favara, Alessandro Riboni, and Francesco Trebbi for research assistance at various
stages of the project. This research is supported by a TMR-grant from the European Commission, and by grants
from Bocconi University, MURST, and the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences.
2 Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) provide an extensive and detailed description of ﬁscal policy in a very large
sample of countries, but they do not ask how policy varies across constitutions.8
of speciﬁc hypotheses, we also go beyond such tests in our search for systematic relationships
in the data.
The political constitution seems to matters a great deal for policy. We ﬁnd striking
similarities between presidential regimes and majoritarian electoral rules. Both institutions are
associated with smaller governments, compared to parliamentary and proportional systems.
The quantitative effect is particularly large and robust for presidential regimes and for the
growth of government over time: towards the end of our sample, presidential regimes have
a smaller size of government of about 10 percent of GDP. How government spending
reacts to economic and political events is also systematically correlated with institutions.
Presidential and majoritarian systems react in a more dampened and less persistent fashion
to income shocks, compared to proportional and parliamentary systems. This could reﬂect a
different composition of spending (social transfer programs tend to be smaller in presidential
and majoritarian democracies), or a different response of the collective decision process
to changing economic circumstances. The peculiar dynamic and stochastic properties of
government spending are also reﬂected in budget deﬁcits, which are smaller in absolute
value and react less to shocks in presidential and majoritarian democracies. Finally, electoral
cycles in ﬁscal policy are also institution-dependent. In all countries, tax revenue goes down
(as a fraction of GDP) at the time of the elections. But in presidential regimes, we also
observe spending cuts and painful ﬁscal adjustments postponed until after the election. And
in parliamentary regimes with proportional elections, social transfers are boosted before and
after the elections. While some of these ﬁndings are consistent with the predictions of existing
theories, others indicate interesting puzzles.
Section 2 provides a background, by sketching some of the main ideas in recent
theoretical work. Section 3 describes our data set, in which the measures of ﬁscal policy
outcomesaswellas political institutionsareclearlymotivatedbythetheory. Section4 explains
our statistical methodology. Section 5 presents our empirical results. Section 6 summarizes
our results and makes suggestions for future research.9
2. Motivation
Why would political institutions shape economic policy? The basic idea is that policy
choices entail conﬂicts among different groups of voters, between voters and politicians
(agency problems), and among different politicians. The way these conﬂicts are resolved,
and thus what ﬁscal policy we observe, hinges on the political institutions in place. Political
constitutions are like incomplete contracts. They do not impose speciﬁc policy choices.
Rather, they spell out how the “control rights” over policy are acquired through elections,
and how they can be exercised in the course of the legislature. Thus, which politicians get the
power to make policy decisions is determined by voters, but is crucially inﬂuenced by rules
for elections. Policy choices are made by elected politicians, but are crucially inﬂuenced by
rules for rule-making and legislation; that is, what political scientists call the regime type.
Asalreadymentionedintheintroduction, arecenttheoreticalliteraturehastriedtomodel
the consequences of these institutions for ﬁscal policy choices. It has focused on the level of
taxation and on the composition of spending, distinguishing between three types of programs:
(i) broad, non-targeted programs beneﬁting large groups of the electorate; (ii) narrow, targeted
programs beneﬁting small groups; (iii) programs beneﬁting mainly incumbent politicians.
Political institutions are modeled as the rules for a speciﬁc policy game, where voters elect
politicalrepresentativeswhointurntakedecisions onﬁscalpolicy. Inthisliterature, alternative
constitutions amount to alternative rules for how to play this game and “comparative politics”
amounts to comparing equilibrium outcomes. Below, we describe the main ideas in a handful
of recent studies which have applied this comparative politics approach. We just outline the
results, emphasizing the speciﬁc predictions regarding the size and composition of public
spending. Interested readers can ﬁnd the details in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Part III).
Electoral rules
Legislative elections around the world differ in several dimensions. The political science
literature emphasizes two: district size and the electoral formula.
3 District size simply
determines how many legislators acquire a seat in a voting district. The electoral formula
determines how votes are translated into seats. Under plurality rule, only the individual(s)
winning the highest vote share(s) get the seat(s) in a given district, whereas proportional
3 Other aspects of the electoral system that differ across countries include thresholds for representation and
the rules governing party lists. See e.g Cox (1997) and Blais and Massicotte (1996) for recent descriptions of
variations in electoral rules across countries.10
representation (PR) instead awards seats to parties in proportion to their vote shares. Existing
theoretical papers have formulated speciﬁc predictions about the effects of district size and the
electoral formula on policy choices in political equilibrium.
Consider district size ﬁrst. Persson and Tabellini (1999), (2000, Ch. 8) predict
that it inﬂuences the composition of government spending. They study two party electoral
competition. Larger voting districts diffuse electoral competition, inducing both parties to
seek support from broad coalitions in the population. Smaller districts instead steer electoral
competition towards narrower, geographical constituencies. With small districts, typically a
party is a sure winner in some districts and a sure loser in others. Electoral competition is
thus concentrated only in some pivotal districts, and both parties have strong incentives to
target redistribution towards such districts. Clearly, broad programs are more effective in
seeking broad support and targeted programs more effective in seeking narrow support. An
example of spending that beneﬁts broad coalitions and cannot easily target speciﬁc district is
welfare spending, which is thus predicted to grow with district size. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti
and Rostagno (2000) reach a similar conclusion, but with a different reasoning. They argue
that with large electoral districts legislators mainly represent socio-economic groups in the
population, while with small districts they mainly represent groups in speciﬁc geographic
locations. Thus, with large electoral districts government policy targets powerful socio-
economic groups, while with small districts it targets powerful geographical groups.
How about the electoral formula? One effect of the winner-takes-all property of plurality
rule is to reduce the minimal coalition of voters needed to win the election. Under single-
member districts and plurality, a party can win with only 25 percent of the national vote:
50 percent in 50 percent of the districts. Under full PR it needs 50 percent of the national
vote; politicians are thus induced to internalize the policy beneﬁts for a larger segment of the
population, which lead them to put stronger emphasis on broad programs than under plurality
(Lizzeri and Persico, 2000, Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Ch. 9).
The electoral formula matters for a second reason. Under plurality rule, voters choose
among individual candidates. Under PR, they choose among party lists. Such lists may dilute
the incentives for individual incumbents to perform well, because they entail a double layer
of delegation: individual legislators are accountable to parties, who in turn are accountable to
voters. Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 9) examine the policy consequences in a Holmström11
(1982)-style, career-concern models. They derive the predictions that opportunistic electoral
cycles, showing up in spending or taxes, are weaker under PR. The reason is that incumbents’
career concerns are stronger under plurality rule and are at their strongest just before elections.
Even though these two features of electoral rules have logically distinct consequences,
they are highly correlated across real-world electoral systems. Some systems can be described
as majoritarian, combining small voting districts with plurality rule. Archetypes here are
elections to the UK parliament or the US Congress, where the candidate collecting the largest
vote share in a district gets the single seat. Some electoral systems are instead decidedly
proportional, combining large electoral districts with proportional representation. Archetypes
are the Dutch and Israeli elections, where parties obtain seats in proportion to their vote shares
in a single national voting district. While we ﬁnd some intermediate systems, most countries
fall quite unambiguously into this crude, binary classiﬁcation. Fortunately, the different
predictions about composition above tend to reinforceeach other. Thus, proportional elections
– with larger districts and PR – should be associated with broader programs and larger welfare
states, and weaker electoral cycles.
A pitfall of the recent theoretical literature is that it has neglected the implications of the
electoral rule on the party structure. Many empirical contributions by political scientists deal
with precisely this aspect (see for instance Lijphart, 1994,1999), emphasizing that majoritarian
elections are associated with a smaller number of parties. Electoral rules may thus also shape
policy indirectly, through the party structure. On the one hand, proportional elections entail
lower barriers to entry for new parties catering to speciﬁcg r o u p so fv o t e r s . O nt h eo t h e r
hand, majoritarian (parliamentary) systems are more likely to produce single-party majority
governments, whereas coalition governments are more likely under proportional elections.
The likely consequences for economic policy have been stressed in several studies. First,
Austen-Smith (2000) takes party structure as exogenous, but assumes that fewer parties are
represented under plurality rule (two parties) than under PR (three parties). He then shows
that the interaction between elections, redistributive taxation, and the formation of economic
groups is likely to produce politico-economic equilibria with higher taxation under PR than
under plurality. Second, the common-pool problem in ﬁscal policy might be more pervasive
under coalition governments. Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) have argued that this could lead
to larger government spending, and Scartascini and Crain (2001) provide further evidence12
of this effect. Third, as coalition governments have more veto players, the status-quo bias
in the face of adverse shocks could be more pronounced (Roubini and Sachs, 1989, Alesina
and Drazen, 1991). Fourth, government crises are more likely and indeed empirically more
frequent under proportional elections, which could lead to greater policy myopia and larger
budget deﬁcits (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991). Fifth,
large swings in the ideological preferences of governments as a result of the elections are less
likely under coalition governments. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) suggest that coalition
governments (and thus proportional elections)correlate with lesspronounced ”partisan” cycles
after the elections. Not all these ideas have been ﬂeshed out with the same analytical rigor as
in the more recent theoretical literature. But they can certainly suggest interpretations for the
empirical ﬁndings we report below.
Regime types
Two crucial aspects of the legislative regime concern the powers over legislation: to
make, amend, or veto policy proposals. The ﬁrst concerns the separation of those powers
across different politicians and ofﬁces. The second concerns the maintenance of powers; in
particular, whether the executive needs sustained conﬁdence by a majority in the legislative
assembly.
As in the case of electoral rules, real-world regimes fall quite unambiguously into a
crude two-way classiﬁcation with regard to these aspects. Presidential regimes typically have
separation of powers, between the president and Congress, but also between congressional
committees that hold important proposal (agenda-setting) powers in different spheres of policy
(as in the US). But they do not have a conﬁdence requirement: the executive can hold on to his
powers without the support of a majority in Congress. In parliamentary regimes the proposal
powers over legislation are instead concentrated in the hands of the government. Moreover,
the government needs the continuous conﬁdence of a majority in parliament to maintain those
powers throughout an entire election period.
Why should separation of powers matter for policy? A classical argument is that
checks and balances constrain politicians from abusing their powers. Persson, Roland, and
Tabellini (1997, 2000) formally demonstrate this old point in models where incumbents are
held accountable by retrospective voters. The upshot is that we should expect weaker political
accountability in parliamentary regimes, resulting in higher rents and higher taxes.13
The conﬁdence requirement has other effects. Parties supporting the executive hold
valuable proposal powers which they risk losing in a government crisis. Therefore, a
conﬁdence requirement creates strong incentives to maintain a stable majority when voting
on policy proposals in the legislature. The absence of a conﬁdence requirement instead leads
to more unstable coalitions and less discipline within the majority.
Building on this idea of “legislative cohesion”, due to Diermeier and Feddersen (1998),
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) derive two additional predictions. In parliamentary
regimes, astablemajority of legislators tends to pursuethejoint interest of its voters. Spending
in parliamentary regimes thus optimally becomes directed towards broad programs that beneﬁt
a majority of voters, such as social security and welfare spending. In presidential regimes,
instead, the (relative) lack of such a majority tends to pit the interests of different minorities
against each other for different issues on the legislative agenda. As a result, the allocation of
spending targets powerful minorities, typically the constituency of the powerful ofﬁceholders
such as the heads of committees in Congress. In parliamentary regimes, the stable majority
of incumbent legislators, and its voters, become prospective residual claimants on additional
revenue. Both favor high taxes and high spending. In presidential regimes, on the other hand,
majorities are not residual claimants on revenue and therefore resist high spending. These
forces produce larger governments (higher taxes) and broader social transfer programs in
parliamentary regimes.
Summary
Let us summarize the main predictions with the help of Table 1. According to the theory,
presidential regimes have smaller governments than parliamentary regimes and less spending
on broad social security and welfare programs. Under majoritarian elections, we should
observe less spending on broad social security and welfare programs than under proportional
elections. The common-pool argument (and the model suggested by Austen-Smith, 2000)
suggests that the electoral rule could also matter for the size of government, with proportional
elections associated with bigger governments. These are all cross-sectional predictions, in that
they have been derived by comparing equilibria in static models.
Some of the theoretical ideas summarized above also have dynamic predictions. Models
stressing the greater status-quo bias and myopia of coalition governments would predict that
proportional-parliamentary systems have larger steady-state debts, and – during the transition14
– larger budget deﬁcits. The stronger incentive to perform under majoritarian elections suggest
that majoritarian-parliamentary countries might have more pronounced electoral cycles than
proportional-parliamentary countries. We have no theoretical prior about deﬁcits and electoral
cycles in presidential regimes. Similarly, to derive speciﬁc implications about the reaction to
shocks under thesesystems, one would need a more precise dynamicmodel, including detailed
assumptions about status-quo policy.
3. Data
In putting our data set together, we have relied on the theory described in Section 2
for the measurement of political institutions and ﬁscal policy outcomes. Data availability
also determines the sample, which comprises yearly data for 61 countries over almost four
decades (1960-98). This panel includes a large number of economic, social and political
variables. Because of missing data and our rules for sampling (described next), however, it
is an unbalanced panel. The sources for all the data used in the paper are listed in the Data
Appendix.
Which countries?
The theory suggests that we should conﬁne our study to countries with democratic
political institutions. Here, we have relied on a well-known classiﬁcation by Freedom House.
Theso-calledGastilindexesofpoliticalrightsandcivillibertiesvaryonascalefrom1to7,low
values being associated with better democratic institutions.
4 To assess a country’s democratic
status in a particular year, we took the average of these two indexes. The Gastil indices are
available annually, from 1972 and onwards. For the earlier period, we follow Barro (1998) and
rely on a measure compiled by Bollen (1990), available every ﬁve years (which we re-scaled
onto a scale from 1 to 7).
We use three different rules for including countries in the sample, and we report results
for all three samples. The most permissive one is to include a country from the point in time
when it ﬁrst obtains a Gastil-score of 5 or lower, but not exclude it from the sample in the
wake of a temporarily higher score reﬂecting restricted democratic rights. This rule permits
a maximum of 61 countries in the sample. We refer to this sample of countries as the Broad
4 According to the index, countries scoring 1 or 2 are “free”, countries scoring from 3 to 5 “semi-free”,
while countries scoring 6 or 7 are “non-free”.15
sample. Our Default sample relies on a more restrictive rule, namely to exclude a country
from the sample in any year when it has a Gastil score of 3.5 or lower. This rule cuts the
number of annual observations in the panel by about 350. As an example, the more restrictive
rule temporarily excludes countries like Turkey (intermittently) and Argentina (in the 80s)
after their ﬁrst entry into the panel. A yet more restrictive rule identiﬁes a Narrow sample as
those countries and years where the Gastil score is less than or equal to 2. Here we lose many
more observations, particularly in the early part of the sample, since we are really restricting
attention to well functioning democracies. As in the Default sample, a few countries enter
and exit from the sample at different points of time. Throughout, we treat these censored
observations as randomly missing and do not attempt to model sample selection. The three
samples are listed in Table 2, along with our classiﬁcation of regime types and electoral rules
(see the next subsection). As an example, Chile enters the Broad sample for the full sample
period, exits from the Default sample between 1974 and 1988, and is only included in the
Narrow sample from 1991 and onwards.
Which political institutions?
Following the theoretical discussion in Section 2, we classify electoral rules and regime
types by means of two indicator (dummy) variables: MAJ and PRES. Majoritarian countries
(MAJ = 1) are those that relied exclusively on plurality rule in its previous most recent election
to the legislature (lower house), the others are proportional (MAJ = 0). Relying on district size
rather than the electoral formula would produce a similar but not identical classiﬁcation.
5 In
some sensitivity analysis, not reported below, we have also allowed for a ﬁner partition that
discriminates between three types: majority, proportional and mixed systems. But when it
comes to the effect on ﬁscal policy outcomes, the effects of mixed and proportional systems
appear to be similar.
With regard to regime type, we classify as presidential (PRES =1 ) countries where
the executive is not accountable to the legislature through a vote of conﬁdence, and those
where it is as parliamentary (PRES = 0). Thus, we try to capture the institutions producing
stable legislative majorities, as discussed in Section 2. (We have not tried to classify countries
on the basis of the checks and balances entailed in the separation of powers granted by their
5 Persson and Tabellini (1999) rely on district size, classifying all countries with an average district size
below two (seats per district) as majoritarian, others as proportional.16
constitutions.) In building this index we had to assess whether or not the ofﬁce of the President
has executive powers in the realm of ﬁscal policy. If not, and if the government is instead
accountable to Parliament through a conﬁdence requirement, the country is classiﬁed as a
parliamentary regime. In evaluating the executive powers of the President, we mainly relied
on Shugart and Carey (1992).
There are very few changes over time in these classiﬁcations (PRES does not vary at
all, whereas MAJ displays time variation in France (which had a brief period of proportional
representation in 1985-86) and in Cyprus only. This stability reﬂects an inertia of political
institutions sometimes called an “iron law” by political scientists. The lack of time variation is
unfortunate in that it provides us with almost no “experiments” in the form of regime changes.
But it is also an indication that it may be correct to treat institutions as given by history, and
not inﬂuenced by reverse causation going from policy outcomes to institutions.
Figure 1 illustrates the institutional variation across countries in 1995. The colored
portions of the map represent the 61 countries in the sample. Striped areas indicate presidential
regimes (PRES = 1), solid areas parliamentary regimes (PRES = 0). Darker shade indicates
majoritarian elections (MAJ = 1), lighter shade proportional elections (MAJ =0 ) . T h el e a s t
common system is the US-style (gray striped) combination of a presidential regime with
majoritarian elections, with only ﬁve countries. But each of the other three combinations
is well represented in the sample. In the last two columns of Table 2, we report the values of
MAJ and PRES (averaged over time) for all the countries in our samples.
As the map illustrates, using theory in the classiﬁcation sometimes produces results
contrary to popular perception. According to our classiﬁcation, parliamentary regimes include
France, Portugal and Finland, with a directly elected president, but where the government
is accountable to the elected assembly and the president has no or little executive powers
over ﬁscal policy. Conversely, the presidential regimes include Switzerland, where there is no
popularly elected president but the permanent coalition executive cannot be brought down by
the legislative assembly.
6
Even a cursory look at the map reveals that our institutional classiﬁcation does not
produce a random outcome. The electoral rule does not exhibit a particular pattern in terms
6 The Swiss constitution indeed resembles the US constitution in many respects beyond the absence of a
conﬁdence requirement.17
of development, but most Anglo-Saxon countries and countries of British colonial origin
have MAJ =1while most of Europe and South America has MAJ =0 . Presidential
regimes are largely conﬁned to non-OECD countries (among the OECD-countries, only the
US and Switzerland have PRES =1 ) . Moreover, many presidential regimes happen to
be in Central and South America, though the sample also includes several non-presidential
Caribbean countries. Other presidential regimes are Nepal, the Philippines, and Senegal.
This non-random pattern of constitutions in our sample raises a fundamental question:
can we really treat theconstitution as exogenous in theempirical analysis that follows?It could
very well be that countries self-select into constitutions on the basis of historical variables and
collective preferences that also inﬂuence policy decisions. To take care of this problem, in
the regressions reported below we try to control for a large set of historical and geographical
variables that might also explain the constitutional origin of a country. But in this paper we do
not seek to explain the constitutional choice itself. In a companion paper (Persson, Tabellini
and Trebbi, 2000), however, we also rely a non-parametric estimator that explicitly allows for
endogenous selection of countries into alternative electoral rules.
Which ﬁscal policy outcomes?
We include ﬁscal-policy outcomes as suggested by the theory. Thus, we measure the
size of government mainly by the ratio of central government spending (inclusive of social
security) to GDP, expressed as a percentage (CGEXP). But we have also looked at central
government revenues and at general government spending, both as a percentage of GDP. For
the composition of government spending we use two measures: social security and welfare
spending(bycentralgovernment)asapercentageofGDP(SSW/GDP),orasaratiotospending
on goods and services (SSW/GDS). The presumption is that broad transfer programs, like
pensions and unemployment insurance, are much harder to target towards narrow geographic
constituencies compared to spending on goods and services. Finally, we look at the size of the
budget surplus of the central government, as a percent of GDP (SURPLUS).
The measures of size and deﬁcits are available for most OECD countries for the entire
period 1960-1998. For many developing countries availability is limited to the period from
the 1970s and onward. Similarly, the measures of the composition of spending do not become
available until the early 1970s. The statistical source for all these variables is the IMF. For
the size of government, budget deﬁcits and debts, we rely on IFS data which is available for a18
longer time series. General government spending and the composition of spending are instead
extracted from the GFS database.
These policy measures vary a great deal, both across time and countries. As an
illustration consider Figure 2, which shows the size of government as measured by central
expenditures in our sample. In the ﬁgure, we see that government expenditure in a typical year
ranges from below 10 percent of GDP to above 50 percent. We also see how the distribution
drifts upwards over time, reﬂe c t i n gg r o w t hi nt h ea v e r a g es i z eo fg o v e r n m e n t–t h ec u r v ei n
the graph – by about 8 percent of GDP from the 1960s to the mid 1990s. Most of this growth
takes place in the 1970s and 80s.
Our measures of the composition of spending also show a wide distribution where
spending on social security and welfare drifts upwards at least until the mid 1980s. The
deﬁcits are also widely distributed across countries, with average deﬁcits having their peak
in the period from the mid 70s to the mid 80s.
Given that we mainly rely on central government spending in our analysis, a natural
question is whether this matters. Suppose, for instance, that presidential regimes were more
decentralized than parliamentary regimes. By looking at central government spending only,
we might than mistakenly interpret a lower size of central government in presidential countries
as due to the regime type, while it could simply reﬂect their lower degree of centralization.
Fortunately, however, centralization of spending is not systematically correlated with the
political constitution, at least in the 41 countries and in the years were data on both levels
of government are available - see the last subsection below.
Which socio-economic controls?
The theory we have surveyed in Section 2 should clearly be understood as providing
ceteris paribus predictions about ﬁscal policy. Therefore, we control for other variables likely
to shape government outlays and revenues. Speciﬁcally, we always include in our regressions
the level of development, measured by the log of real per capita income (LYH) ,am e a s u r eo f
openness (TRADE), deﬁned as exports plus imports over GDP, and two variables measuring
the demographic composition, deﬁned as the percentages of the population between 15 and 64
years of age (PROP1564), and above 65 years of age (PROP65), respectively. These variables
have beenshowtocorrelate withmeasuresofﬁscalpolicyinpreviousstudies, suchasCameron19
(1978), Rodrik (1998), and Persson and Tabellini (1999). We will refer to this basic set of
controls by X1.
Depending on the speciﬁcation, the dependent variable and the frequency of sampling,
we have also included several other variables, such as the price of oil in US dollars (OIL),
income shocks, measuredeitherasthegrowth rateofrealGDP orasthelogdifferencebetween
real GDP and its trend computed with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter (YSHOCK), and levels of
government debt, as a percentage of GDP (DEBT).
To cope with the non-random pattern of constitutions noted above, we also use several
indicator variables, measuring geographic locations, legal origin, colonial origins, federal or
unitary structure, and election dates. All these variables are deﬁned more precisely in the Data
Appendix.
Summary statistics
Tables 3a and 3b display the correlation matrix between our main variables of interest.
Table 3a shows cross-country correlations, with data averaged over the full period for which
we have observations for each variable-country pair. Table 3b instead pools the yearly
observations for all countries. Both tables display a similar pattern. While the electoral
rule appears uncorrelated with the socio-economic controls, the regime type is much more
correlated with the level of development and the demographic structure, in line with our
previous observation that most presidential regimes are outside the OECD countries. We
also see that presidential regimes are associated with smaller governments and smaller social
security and welfare spending, whereas majoritarian electoral rules are correlated with larger
surpluses and smaller social security and welfare spending. These correlations are not
inconsistent with the theoretical predictions summarized in Table 1.
As Table 3a shows the variable CENTRAL – deﬁned as the ratio of central to general
government expenditure – is neither systematically related to our measures of institutions, nor
to the overall size of government. (This variable can be constructed for 41 countries between
the early 1970s and the late 1980s.) The lack of correlation with political institutions reassures
us that focusing on central government spending will not systematically bias our results.20
4. Methodology
Our empirical analysis is certainly motivated by theory. We aim as much at establishing
empirical regularities, however, as at testing hypotheses derived from speciﬁc models. That
is, we would like to succinctly describe systematic relations in the data, establishing some
stylized facts about the effect of institutions on policy outcomes. For this reason, we follow an
eclectic approach.
A general formulation
The regressions we estimate in the paper are all derived from the following general
formulation:
yit = αi + γisit + βiqt + δxit + ηzi + uit .( 1 )
In (1), yit denotes a speciﬁc policy outcome in country i in year t and Greek boldface letters
denote vectors of unknown parameters to be estimated, possibly varying across countries or
groups of countries. We allow for a country-speciﬁc average, αi. Policy can be inﬂuenced
directly by the institutions zit, concretely the two dummy variables MAJ and PRES.It can
also be affected by vectors of socio-economic control variables: sit and qt denote country-
speciﬁc and common variables the slope coefﬁcients of which are allowed to vary, whereas the
variables in xit are instead constrained to have the same impact on all countries. Finally, uit
is an unobserved error term.
We want to test two sets of hypotheses. The ﬁrst is whether institutions have a direct
impact on policy outcomes, which is really what most of the theory discussed in Section 2 was
about. The nul hypothesis corresponding to this question can be formulated as:
H
D
0 : η =0.
Cross-section regressions
To see how we may test the ﬁrst hypothesis, HD
0 ,w et a k et i m ea v e r a g e so f( 1 )w i t h i n
each country, and rewrite it as (a bar over a variable denotes a time average):
¯ yi =( αi + γi¯ si + βi¯ q)+ηzi + δ¯ xi +¯ ui .( 2 )21
Equation (2) can be estimated on cross-sectional data with standard methods, with the
estimated intercept capturing the effect of all variables within brackets. The t-statistic on
PRESand MAJ is then a test of the nul hypothesis HD
0 .
Time variation in the data
Such cross-sectional estimates have the advantage of being closely related to some
existing theories. But they do not exploit the time variation in the data. Moreover, they
might be subject to simultaneity problems in the form of omitted-variable bias: as discussed
above some forces selecting political institutions in historical times may also drive economic
policy outcomes. The institutional variation over time is too small to circumvent this problem
of “historical omitted variables” by conventional ﬁxed-effects, panel-data estimation. For
practical purposes, zit is given by a constant, zi, equal to the time average zi. Thus, we cannot
separatelyestimatetheeffectsonpolicyofacountry’s institutions,zi,andothertime-invariant,
country-speciﬁcf e a t u r e s ,αi.
For this reason we also ask a slightly different question, namely whether political
institutions have an indirect, or non-linear, effect on policy. In particular, we ask whether
different electoral rules and political regimes induce different policy responses to economic
and political events. Even if the cross-section results might be plagued by simultaneity, it is
much less plausible that the forces selecting the observed political institutions in historical
times would be systematically correlated with the response to economic and political events
during our recent sample period.
The nul hypothesis corresponding to this second question is whether countries with
different values of zi nevertheless have the same coefﬁcients γ and β in (1):
H
I
0 : γi = γj and/or βi = βj even if zi 6= zj .
Recall, however, that the speciﬁc theoretical contributions discussed in Section 2, are either
static, or have rather loose predictions concerning the link between institutions and policies.
Most of our tests for indirect effects (non-linearities) should thus be seen as a search for
empirical regularities rather than tests of speciﬁc predictions.22
Non-observable common events
There are various ways of testing HI
0, that is, the absence of an indirect effect of
institutions. It is plausible that a set of common economic and political events have affected
ﬁscal policy in all countries. We need only think about the worldwide turn to the left in the late
1960s and 70s, or the productivity slowdown and oil shocks in the 1970s and 80s. But suppose
we do not want to commit to, or cannot observe, all such events. Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000) suggest a simple statistical method for estimating how labor-market institutions might
inﬂuence the adjustment of unemployment to unobservable shocks. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti
and Rostagno (2000) indeed apply this method to study how the proportionality of electoral
systems affects policy in the OECD countries.
Assume that the response to observable country-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e si st h es a m ei na l l
countries, γi = γj in (1). Then we can lump all the variables in sit together with those in
xit and rewrite (1) as:
yit =( αi + ηzi)+( 1+λ(zi − z))βqt + δxit + uit .( 3 )
We can use a set of time dummies (one per time period) to estimate, βqt, the common effect of
the common events in (3). The institution-speciﬁc effect of common events qt is proportional
to the term λ(zi − z) on the right-hand side, where z is the cross-country average of zi. The
form of (3) tells us to estimate the crucial parameter λ by NLS and include ﬁxed effects to
pick up the country-speciﬁc intercept given by the ﬁrst term. We use both annual data and
ﬁve-year averages. The latter may be more robust to measurement error and allow better for
discretionary adjustments of policy than yearly data.
Observable economic events
Yet another way of testing whether institutions induce different policy responses to
shocks and other variables is to focus on speciﬁc observable events. These may be economic
events, such as changes in the price of oil, country income, or changes in population structure.
To assess whether the impact of such common or country-speciﬁc events on policy outcomes
depends on institutions, we can re-write (1) as:
yit =( αi + ηzi)+( β + λzi)qt +( γ + µzi)sit + δxit + uit .( 4 )23
Finding coefﬁcients µ or λ different from zero thus implies an indirect effect of institutions
through these observable events. We use two basic estimation methods: (i) ﬁxed effects
estimation, to control for the ﬁrst country-speciﬁc term on the right-hand side of (4);
sometimes we jointly estimate spending, revenues and deﬁcit equation by seemingly unrelated
regressions; (ii)wetakeﬁrstdifferencestowipethistermoutandthenestimatebyinstrumental
variables. In (i ) and (ii) we always include the lagged dependent variable yit−1 either in xit
or in sit.
7 We also report some GLS estimates of the difference speciﬁcation (with no lagged
dependent variable), to allow for heteroskedasticity and panel-speciﬁc autocorrelation in uit.
Electoral cycles
Finally, we test for an institution-dependent response to observable political events, in
the form of elections. As we saw in Section 2, theory indicates that we should expect at least
the electoral rule to affect the strength of the electoral cycle. For this purpose, we construct
an indicator variable, ELt, taking a value of 1 if there was an election in country i in year t,
and 0 otherwise (sometimes, as noted below, ELt equals 1 if there was an election in either
year t or year t +1 ). For presidential regimes, the election date is that of the president, for
parliamentary regimes it is that of the legislative assembly’s lower house. We then expand sit,
the vector of country-speciﬁc events, to include indicator variables for election years, ELt,
and post-election years, ELt−1. Otherwise, the speciﬁcation is identical to that in our tests
for institution-dependent responses to economic events. The estimation methods are also the
same as those described above, except that the speciﬁcation includes a set of common time
dummies, to allow a more precise estimation of the electoral cycle.
5. Results
In this section, we report the results obtained by applying the methodology discussed
in the previous section to our three policy outcomes: the size of government, the government
surplus and the composition of government spending.
5.1 Size and surplus of government
7 As is well known, the presence of a lagged dependent variable can bias the ﬁxed-effects estimator even if
the error term is not correlated over time. But in panels where the time series dimension is as long as ours, the
bias is rather small. Transforming the data to ﬁrst differences removes the ﬁxed effect part of the error term, but
may aggravate the correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent variable (see, for instance Baltagi,
1995, Ch 8). This is why when differencing we rely on instrumental variable estimation, where the instruments
are the lagged explanatory variables (in differences) and the lagged dependent variable in level lagged twice, as
suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Arrellano and Bond (1991).24
Cross-country variation in the size of government
We begin with the cross-sectional regressions testing HD
0 for the presence of a direct
effect of institutions on the size of government. The results are displayed in Table 4. The
major dependent variable is expenditures by central government (Columns 1-3 and 7), but we
also include results for central government revenue (Columns 4-5) and general government
expenditure (Column 6). Every speciﬁcation includes our basic set of controls X1 and all
but one also include dummies for continents and colonial origin. Every regression except
the last one relies on data from the full length of the panel. Most regressions refer to our
Default sample of countries (a Gastil index less than or equal to 3.5, applied year by year), but
two (Columns 3 and 5) refer to the Broad sample. All variables are measured in levels. The
estimation method is Weighted Least Squares, where each country’s weight is proportional
to the length of its panel (the results for unweighted OLS regressions are similar). The table
displays the estimated η parameters for the PRES and MAJ dummies. Bracketed expressions
are p-values for false rejection of η =0 . Boldface font denotes a coefﬁcient signiﬁcantly
different from zero at the 10 percent level.
Our two institutional measures always enter with a negative sign. The effect for MAJ
is statistically insigniﬁcant in half the cases. The ﬁnding that majoritarian countries have
signiﬁcantly smaller governments in terms of revenue but not in terms of spending turns
out to reﬂect systematically smaller deﬁcits.
8 Evidence of a large and statistically robust
negative effect of majoritarian elections is limited to general government expenditures. Note,
however, that – due to data availability – the panel in this case is both shorter and restricted
to a much smaller number of countries. Our result that majoritarian countries have smaller
general governments is consistent with the ﬁndings by Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2000) for the
OECD countries.
The presidential dummy variable is instead consistently signiﬁcant, except in the case of
general government where the sample includes considerably fewer presidential regimes, and
in the broad sample that includes the more dubious democracies. The ﬁnding that presidential
8 Similar cross-sectional estimates for the government surplus indicate that average deﬁcits are smaller
in countries with either presidential regimes or majoritarian elections. The effect of the electoral system is
considerably more robust to inclusion of regional and colonial dummies, however. Consistent with our ﬁndings
on spending and revenue in Table 4, the estimates imply a smaller average deﬁcit by 1.5 to 2 percent of GDP
under plurality rule.25
regimeshave smaller governments is clearly in line with the theoretical predictioninSection 2.
According to the point estimates, the effect is substantial: about 5 percent of GDP. It appears
to be slightly smaller in the larger sample, which corresponds to the broader deﬁnition of
democracy.
In some speciﬁcations, not reported, we also included a dummy variable taking a value
of 1 for federal countries, and 0 otherwise. The coefﬁcients of interest, of PRES and MAJ,
were never affected. The federalism variable had a negative estimated coefﬁcient that was
statistically signiﬁcant in some regressions but not in others.
9
As the last column shows, the negative effect of PRES is much stronger – above 10
percent of GDP – for cross sections based on data from the 1990s, rather than the whole
sample. It is also statistically much more robust. These ﬁndings are consistent with the
empirical results in Persson and Tabellini (1999), who considered data from around 1990.
Together, the ﬁndings suggest that the negative sign of the PRES dummy might largely reﬂect
a faster growth of government in parliamentary regimes in the last four decades. As Figure 3
illustrates, this time pattern is clearly visible already in the raw data. The graph is identical
to Figure 2, except that the data is partitioned into presidential regimes, marked with black
diamonds and a thick curve for the average, and parliamentary regimes, marked with circles
and a thin curve.
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Unobservable common events and the size of government
Next, we turn to the time variation in the data, testing HI
0 for (the absence of) an
institution-dependent reaction of the size of government to economic and political events.
We begin with the effect of unobservable common events variables, using the speciﬁcation in
equation (3).
Table 5 displays selected results for expenditures and revenue as the dependent variable,
for yearly data and ﬁve-year averages, and for the broad and default sample of countries.
9 We relied on threee very closely related classiﬁcations of countries into federal or unitary states, provided
by Boix (2000), Scartascini and Crain (2000) and Treisman (2000), that mainly look at the political structure and
the authonomy of states and local governments. Scartsascini and Crain (2000) ﬁnd a robust and signiﬁcant effect
of federalism on the size of government in a similar sample of countries. These measures of federalism, like the
centralization of spending discussed in the previous section, are uncorrelated with both MAJ and PRES.
10 The result that the estimated coefﬁcient on PRES is larger in absolute value in the more recent cross
sectional estimates is not due to a different sample of countries beeing included in later years compared to the
early period, since it holds even if we hold the sample of countries ﬁxed.26
All variables are measured in levels and each speciﬁcation includes country ﬁxed effects
on top of the basic controls in X1.T h e ﬁrst two rows in the table report the coefﬁcients
on the institutional variables: our estimates of λ in (3). The results remain similar if we
extend the vector of observable controls to include the lagged dependent variable or income
shocks, as in Table 6 below. Both PRES and MAJ are negative and highly signiﬁcant across
all speciﬁcations.
One way of interpreting the results is to consider a common event in some period t
that raises government spending by 1 percent of GDP in an average country: i.e., an event
corresponding to β(qt − qt−1)=1 . Then, a coefﬁcient of about -1 on PRES means that the
effectisabout1.4percentofGDPinparliamentaryregimes, butonly0.4percentinpresidential
regimes (recall that zi in (3) is adjusted by the sample mean, which is about 0.4 for PRES).
Similarly, the effect is 1
3 of a percent smaller under majoritarian rather than proportional
elections. Identical speciﬁcations for the government surplus (not shown) produce similar
results.
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The estimated effects of the common events on the size of government, the sequence
of βqt in (3), generally reﬂect the time pattern suggested by Figures 2 and 3: the estimated
coefﬁcients on the time dummies grow from the beginning of the sample until the mid 1980s,
thenthey remainconstant ordrop slightly. Theirsigndepend on theprecisespeciﬁcation(since
we include ﬁxed effects, data are measured in deviations from country means), but their time
proﬁle is stable. Figure 4 illustrates the estimated coefﬁcients of the time dummies pertaining
to column 1 in Table 5. The effects of the common events are shown by the dashed line for
an average country, by the thick solid line for a presidential regime (PRES =1 ) ,a n db yat h i n
solid line for a parliamentary regime (PRES = 0). The negative parameter estimates reported
in Table 5 thus suggest that whatever unobservable events caused the growth in government
in the sample as a whole, their effect was signiﬁcantly smaller in countries with presidential
regimes and majoritarian elections.
Another way of gauging the results is thus to consider the cumulative effect of the
common events over the course of the sample, as measured by β(qT −q1) –i nt e r m so fFigure
11 NLS estimation of the adjustment of the government surplus suggest that unobservable common events
have smaller effects in presidential regimes and under majoritarian elections. An unobservable event that raises
the average country’s surplus by 1 percent of GDP thus has an effect about 0.5 percent smaller both in presidential
(vs. parliamentary) regimes and under majoritarian (vs. proportional) elections.27
4 this measure corresponds to the vertical distance between the ﬁrst and the last observation.
The cumulative effect is positive on average (i.e., for the sample as a whole). The last two
rows in Table 5 show how much this cumulative effect differs across institutions, according
to our point estimates. For government spending, the difference between presidential and
parliamentary regimes is just above 10 percent of GDP, which well matches our estimate in the
last columnofTable4ofa cross-sectional differencein the1990s ofjustabove 10 percent. The
inﬂuence of the electoral rule is also statistically signiﬁcant but quantitatively less important,
between 3 and 6 percentage points of GDP, again about the same order of magnitude as in the
cross-sectional regressions.
Altogether, the results in Tables 4 and 5 convey a similar message. The size
of government is strongly inﬂuenced by the political constitution. Proportional and
parliamentary systems spend the most, while presidential regimes and countries electing their
legislatures by plurality rules spend the least. The regime type has a larger and more robust
effect than the electoral rule.
Observable economic events and the size of government
We now ask whether the impact of observable determinants of the size of government
depends on institutions. We mainly focus on income shocks, since they are one of the main
sources of time variation in government outlays and receipts. Our goal is to ﬁnd out whether
the cyclical response of ﬁscal policy is affected by the political constitution. We measure
income shocks (YSHOCK) as the log-deviation of real income from its (Hodrick-Prescott)
trend. We then interact this variable with our two measures of institutions, so as to estimate
the coefﬁcients µ and λ in equation (4). As institutions might also inﬂuence the persistence
of spending or taxation after an income shock, we also interact the lagged dependent variable
with PRES and MAJ. Throughout, we treat income shocks as exogenous in the regression.
Their amplitude is about the same on average in countries ruled by different institutions.
There are several reasons to expect that the cyclical response of ﬁscal policy might
be inﬂuenced by the constitution. First, cyclical ﬂuctuations induce an automatic response
of entitlement spending: welfare spending as a fraction of GDP is likely to increase more
than other government outlays during cyclical downturns. But the constitution is likely to
inﬂuence the relative importance of entitlement spending. According to the theories reviewed
in section 2, proportional and parliamentary systems should have bigger welfare states. This28
prior is also born out in the data: as further discussed below, parliamentary countries with
proportional elections devote almost 12 percent of GDP on average (across countries and
years) to social security and welfare spending. In the remaining groups (presidential or
parliamentary-majoritarian), this average is about 4-5 percent of GDP. Hence, we should
expect spending to be more counter-cyclical and more elastic to cyclical ﬂuctuations in
proportional-parliamentary systems .
Second, the constitution might also have a direct effect on the discretionary reaction of
policy to exogenous events. Coalition governments are often said to have a greater status quo
bias than single party majorities, because of the difﬁculties of bargaining within the governing
coalitions. The number of veto players is generally thought to be higher in presidential
regimes, because of their stronger separation of powers. More generally, the different rules
for legislative bargaining in presidential and parliamentary democracies suggest that shocks to
the status quo might induce different policy reactions in these regimes. Here, however, it is
more difﬁcult to predict theobservedresponseofgovernment spendingorrevenue to aggregate
income shocks.
Yet another possibility is that some types of democracies are more likely to face
borrowing constraints in ﬁnancial markets. As already noted, many presidential regimes are
in Latin America, where sovereign debt crisis or exchange rate crisis have been more frequent
than in other democracies. Borrowing constraints would impart a procyclical bias to ﬁscal
policy: governments are forced to cut spending or raise revenues when hit by a recession or by
a ﬁnancial crisis, since they cannot let the deﬁcit absorb the shock. Indeed, other studies have
shown that ﬁscal policy in Latin America tends to be much more pro-cyclical than elsewhere
– see in particular Gavin and Perotti (1997).
Table 6 displays our estimates, for government spending and revenues (of central
government only). We rely on the three estimation methods discussed in Section 4, namely in
levels with country ﬁxed effects, and in differences with instrumental variables and with GLS.
When estimating in levels, the spending and revenues equation are often jointly estimated by
SUR as indicated. The vector of other controls X2, not reported in the table, includes the
same basic variable as in the previous tables, plus the oil price and the trend of aggregate
real income from which the shock is computed. Time-dummy variables, colonial origin
and continental dummy variables are not included in the regression. A P* in front of a29
variable denotes that the variable is interacted with the PRES dummy variable, while a M*
denotes interaction with the MAJ dummy. The results we report here are robust to estimation
methods, samples and measurements (we also measured income shocks as the yearly growth
rate in income, and obtained similar ﬁndings). We also tried to interact institutions with other
common and country-speciﬁc socio-economic variables, such as the oil price or the proportion
of population above 65 years of age. Some of these interaction terms were occasionally
signiﬁcantly different from zero; although not robust to speciﬁcation or estimation method,
these results reinforce the general message below.
The central message of Table 6 is that institutions matter a great deal. Consider the ﬁrst
three columns of the table. In proportional and parliamentary countries, income shocks affect
central government spending as a proportion of GDP. The estimated coefﬁcient ofYSHOCK is
consistently negative with a value around - 0.2, meaning that a 10 percent drop in real income
induces a rise in the spending ratio of 2 percentage points. When the size of government is
measured by revenues, rather than by spending, the estimated coefﬁcient drops in absolute
value, but remains negative and statically signiﬁcant. Because spending and revenue are
highly serially correlated, this effect persists over time. By contrast, policy in presidential
and majoritarian countries is not affected by the income shock; in presidential countries
spending even appears to be pro-cyclical. Moreover, persistence in the size of government is
signiﬁcantly smaller, particularly in presidential regimes. This pattern of reactions to income
shocks is consistent with the observation that welfare state tends to be larger in proportional
cum parliamentary systems: the outlays of such entitlement programs are ﬁx e di nc a s ht e r m s ,
or perhaps even inversely related to income. But, as argued above, there are other plausible
reasons why government outlays might move more than in proportion to aggregate income in
proportional-parliamentary democracies but not elsewhere.
To gain a better understanding, column 4 disaggregates income shocks into positive
(YSH_POS) and negative (YSH_NEG). An asymmetry is apparent. Only negative income
shocks have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the spending ratio, and their estimated
coefﬁcient is much larger in absolute value. This asymmetric effect suggests that a ratchet
effect might be in place. A negative income shock induces a lasting expansion in the size of
government, which is not undone when income grows above potential. But this effect is not
present in presidential or majoritarian countries, where a ratchet effect instead appears to be30
associatedwith positiveincome shocks. This different ratchet effectacrossconstitutional types
is hard to explain just on the basis of the different size of entitlement programs. It is instead
in line with the idea that presidential countries are more likely to face borrowing constraints:
when positive income shock occurs, they are able to expand aggregate spending more than in
proportion to income; but when hit by a recession, they are forced to enact sharp spending cuts.
If correct, this interpretation would lead to the further question of why presidential regimes
would be more likely to be credit rationed, or more generally why they would be more risky
borrowers. Whatever the interpretation of this ratchet effect, it could contribute to account for
the differential growth of government in different political systems that we uncovered in the
previous subsections. Thus, the possibility and precise explanation of an institution-dependent
ratchet effects certainly deserve more attention in future research.
Finally, in columns 5 and 6 we turn to other estimation methods. The results on the
income shocks stand, but the coefﬁcient on lagged spending drops and differences across
institutions disappear. This last ﬁnding is important, as this coefﬁcient could be biased in the
level-speciﬁcation due to the panel structure of the data. Note also that these results are robust
across samples of countries. In particular, the same pattern of reactions to income shocks are
observed in our broad and narrow samples of democracies.
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Observable economic events and the budget surplus
As the budget surplus is deﬁned as the difference between revenues and spending, it is
natural to ask how the same observable events manifest themselves in the budget surplus. To
d ot h a t ,w eu s eas p e c i ﬁcation consistent with the earlier regressions for central government
revenues and spending. As those include lagged revenues and spending, respectively, we
include the same variables in the surplus regression (but do not constrain their respective
coefﬁcients to sum to zero). Since the surplus is also closely related to changes in government
debt, stationarityofthedebttoGDPratiorequires thatthesurplus also reacts to theoutstanding
stock of debt. We thus include lagged debt in the regression (including it in the spending and
12 We have assumed that the coefﬁcients on LAG_SIZE and YSHOCK are the same within country groups,
but different across groups with different political institutions. A more general approach would be to allow
coefﬁcients to differ across all countries, while looking for differences across countries belonging to different
groups. We have also tried the latter approach, by estimating the regressions in Table 6 by the method of random
coeffcients. The (mean) coefﬁcients on LAG_SIZE in the group of presidential regimes is about 0.2 higher than
in the group of parliamentary regimes in consistency with the pooled regressions (both coefﬁcients are precisely
estimated, although lower than in the pooled regressions). Similarly, the estimated coefﬁcient on YSHOCK is
negative in the parliamentary group, wheras it is positive in the presidential group (although both have a high
standard error).31
revenues regressions above does not change the previous results). We allow the coefﬁcients
on lagged debt, as well as on lagged spending and revenues, to differ for countries ruled by
different institutions, but for the rest, the speciﬁcation is the same as in Table 6.
As in the previous subsections, we estimate the regressions in levels and in differences.
In the ﬁrst case, we always include country ﬁxed effects and estimate by SUR, jointly with the
spending and revenues regressions (the results are similar if we estimate the surplus regression
in isolation). When estimating in differences, we rely on IV estimation, as in the previous
subsection. But here, we exploit the fact that the surplus is approximately equal to the change
in debt (with reverse sign). We thus run a regression of the surplus (in levels) on the lagged
surplus and on all the other right hand side variables in ﬁrst differences, omitting lagged debt.
The instruments are the levels of spending, revenues and surplus, all lagged twice, as well as
the other right hand side variables in differences lagged once.
13
Table 7 shows the results. Consider the ﬁrst three columns, estimated in levels. As
expected, we ﬁnd that surpluses (as a percent of GDP) are procyclical – they go up with
positive income shocks – in the average country. But presidential regimes are different, with
acyclical or even countercyclical surpluses. Majoritarian elections seem to have a similar
effect, albeitnotstatisticallysigniﬁcant. Theorderofmagnitudeoftheseestimatedcoefﬁcients
is in line with those estimated in Table 6 with regard to revenues and spending. These results
are also stable across the samples of democracies, except that the presidential effect becomes
even stronger in the narrow sample. The fourth column disaggregates the income shocks into
positive and negative shocks. As in the case of spending, there is some evidence of a ratchet
effect: negative income shocks reduce the surplus while positive shocks have no effect. But
now the differences across institutions are not statistically signiﬁcant.
13 Write the level speciﬁcation for the surplus as:
zit = αi + γiτit−1 − βigit−1 + λibit−1 + δxit + uit ,
where z denotes the surplus, τ revenue, g spending and b public debt, all in percentage of GDP, while x denotes
the vector of observable shocks. Taking differences (∆) and noting that zit−1 ≈ −∆bit−1, we can rewrite the
surplus regression as:
zit = γi∆τit−1 − βi∆git−1 +( 1 − λi)zit−1 + δ∆xit + ∆uit .32
The ﬁrst three rows of the table show the reaction of the surplus to lagged debt. As
expected, the surplus is higher when the debt is larger. But this does not happen in the
presidential regimes (except in the narrow sample, where all regimes appear similar). Though
not reported in the Table, we also ﬁnd that the surplus reacts to lagged spending and revenues.
A sa l r e a d yf o u n di nTable 6, the coefﬁcients on lagged spending and revenues is smaller (in
absolute value) in the PRES countries. Thus, the regime type appears to inﬂuence not only the
reaction of the surplus to income shocks, but also its dynamics.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 7 report the IV estimates of the speciﬁcation
in differences. This estimation method leads to very unstable estimates, except for the
estimated coefﬁcient on lagged deﬁcit which has most of the explanatory power (the estimated
coefﬁcient on lagged deﬁcit is much larger than that on lagged debt, as it ought to be, because
of the variable transformation – see the expressions in Footnote 10). Deﬁcits in presidential
regimes appear tohave much lessinertia (more mean reversion) than inparliamentaryregimes.
Majoritarian elections modify the dynamics in a similar way, but, again, not as strongly.
These results are consistent with the different dynamic response of deﬁcits to debt in the
levels regressions. Although evidence remains of a different reaction to income shocks in
presidential regimes, the coefﬁcient for the reference countries is almost zero. Moreover, the
estimated coefﬁcients on the income shocks are now quite unstable across speciﬁcation and
lists of instruments, a sign that these IV estimates are less reliable.
Electoral cycles
We next ask whether there is an electoral cycle in spending or revenue, whether it occurs
before or after the elections, and whether its magnitude depends on institutions. As explained
in Section 4, we essentially rely on the same speciﬁcation as that underlying Table 6, except
that we expand sit with indicator variables for current and lagged elections. We also drop the
price of oil from the speciﬁcation, and include instead a set of year dummies, so as to identify
the effect of elections more precisely. PRES and MAJ are still interacted with the lagged
dependent variable and with YSHOCK, as in Table 6. In the levels speciﬁcations, we estimate
the spending and revenues equations jointly by SUR.
Table 8 reports the results for different samples and different estimation methods. The
ﬁrst six columns rely on the basic speciﬁcation where ELt includes only the election year. As
this measure does not distinguish between elections held early and late in the year, we have33
also used an alternative measure where ELt is redeﬁned as taking a value of 1 if there was an
election in either year t or in year t+1. That is, a pre-election cycle is deﬁned by ﬁscal policy
in the year before the election as well as in the year of the election. Our estimates in the last
two columns of the table rely on this alternative deﬁnition.
We ﬁnd a strong electoral cycle in spending and taxation, but it takes a very different
form in presidential and parliamentary democracies.
14 Consider presidential regimes ﬁrst.
There is strong evidence that they postpone ﬁscal adjustments until after the election. Once the
election is over, spending is cut by almost 1 percent of GDP and revenues hiked by at least 0.5
percent of GDP. Whether presidential regimes have a pre-election cycle is more ambiguous
and sensitive to our deﬁnition of the election dummy. According to columns 1-6, nothing
of statistical signiﬁcance happens during the election year. But estimates based on the more
comprehensive deﬁnition of ELt in the last two columns suggest a tax break of about 0.7
percent of GDP before the election.
In parliamentary regimes, on the other hand, we only ﬁnd a pre-election cycle, and only
on the revenue side. Revenues are cut by about 0.3 percent before elections, while government
spending does not seem affected by the election date.
We also investigated the speciﬁc prediction of the theory in Section 2, that majoritarian
electoral rules are associated with stronger electoral cycles (results not reported). While
the coefﬁcient on ELt typically turns out to be larger (in absolute value) in parliamentary
countries with plurality elections than in those with proportional elections, the difference is
only statistically signiﬁcant in a few speciﬁcations.
Finally, we look for evidence of electoral cycles in the budget surplus. As Table 9 shows,
we ﬁnd a post-election cycle: improvements in the surplus on the order of 0.5-1 percent
points of GDP are postponed until the year after the election. Again, this electoral cycle is
present only in presidential regimes, consistently with our results for government spending and
revenue. This cycle is statistically signiﬁcant only in the estimation in differences, however,
and appears more pronounced in the broad sample of democracies. There is no evidence of a
14 Earlier studiesoninternational data conductedwith different methodologies hadtypicallynot found robust
evidence of an electoral cycle (see Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997 for a summary). An exception is the recent
study by Shi and Svensson (2000), who use panel data for over 100 countries and ﬁnd signiﬁcant electoral cycles
in spending, revenues and government deﬁcits. But they only search for pre-election cycles and do not explore
institutional differences across countries.34
pre-election deﬁcit cycle in parliamentary regimes. Neither is there any systematic inﬂuence
of the electoral rule in these regimes (results not shown in the Table). As a ﬁnal check on
the robustness we also used the more comprehensive deﬁnition of the pre-election cycle. The
results (not reported) do not change much, except that the evidence of a post-election cycle in
the budget surplus for presidential regimes becomes even stronger.
To understand why presidential regimes display systematic cycles in all ﬁscal aggregates
before and after elections, while parliamentary regimes mainly have a pre-election revenue
cycle, is an interesting issue for further theoretical research. Future research ought to pay more
attention to one issue in particular. While in presidential regimes elections of the president
tend to be exogenous, in many parliamentary regimes they are endogenous; in our sample,
elections are also somewhat more frequent in parliamentary than in presidential regimes. In
our estimates we ignore this potentially important difference across groups of countries.
5.2 Composition of spending
We now turn to the composition of government. Recall that our two measures of
composition include central government spending on social security and welfare, either as
a percent of GDP (SSW/GDP), or as a ratio to central government spending on goods and
services (SSW/GDS). We have already noted that different groups of countries have very
different welfare states: the large welfare states are a feature of proportionalcum parliamentary
systems. But do these differences remain after controlling for other social and economic
features of these countries? And does social security and welfare spending react to income
shocks and to election dates? As the methodological considerations closely follow those in the
previous subsection, we keep the discussion of our results more brief.
Cross-section regressions
We start with cross-sectional tests for a direct effect of institutions. Estimation results
are shown in Table 10 for both our measures of composition. Note that data availability
restricts the full sample to the period from 1972. The results indicate that broad, non-targeted
programs are indeed systematically smaller under majoritarian elections, as predicted by the
t h e o r yd i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n2 .Ceteris paribus, social security and welfare spending is smaller
by 1-2 percentage points, when measured as a percentage of GDP, and about 0.20-0.40 points
lower, when measured as a ratio to spending on goods and services (in this latter case, the
dependent variable takes values close to 1 on average). Statistically, these results are more35
fragile to the sample and the inclusion of socio-economic controls than were the results for
overall spending. Qualitatively, they are in line with the ﬁndings of Milesi-Ferretti et al (2000)
for the OECD countries.
Unlike for the size of government, however, we ﬁnd no discernible effect of the regime
type on our measures of composition after controlling for our usual observable variables. On
average, presidential regimes have much smaller welfare states than parliamentary countries.
But this appears to be due to a different demographic composition and to other economic
features, not to the political institution per se, at least when we neglect the time variation in
the data.
Unobservable common events
What about the indirect effects of institutions? Results from our estimates of the
adjustment to common unobservable events are collected in Table 11. As in the case of
overall spending, we ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant inﬂuence of political institutions. Now both
the electoral rule and the regime type matter. Unobservable common events have a smaller
effect on the spending ratio (SSW/GDS) under majoritarian elections and under presidential
regimes. When social security and welfare is measured as a share of GDP, the estimated effect
of presidential regimes is particularly relevant, with a cumulative difference of about 5 percent
of GDP. As the estimated effects of the common events (the time sequence of βqt )g r o w
throughout the entire course of the sample, the last result can be interpreted as evidence of
more rapid growth of welfare-state spending in parliamentary than in presidential regimes.
Finally, note that the inﬂuence of political institutions appears weaker in the broader sample
of democracies. A likely reason is that this broad sample includes a number of developing
countries, where the welfare state is too small to be meaningfully compared to the larger
welfare states in the OECD.
Observable economic events
Table 12 summarizes our results regarding the adjustment to income shocks. Here
we only report results on social security and welfare as a share of GDP, as the results for
SSW/GDS are less robust. The estimated coefﬁcients resemble the pattern we obtained in
Table 6 for the overall size of government. Presidential and majoritarian systems have a
dampened reaction to income shocks, and less persistence, compared to parliamentary and
proportional systems. The result on persistence is less robust across estimation methods,36
however, as already found in Table 6. Moreover, comparing these estimates with those in
Table 6, income shocks have a smaller impact on this component of the budget than on the
overall budget size. This suggests that automatic stabilizers due to the larger welfare states of
proportional-parliamentary countries cannot fully explain the different cyclical reaction of the
size of government and the budget surplus, noted in the previous subsection.
Electoral cycles
Do we ﬁnd a systematic effect of elections on the composition of spending? The answer
is positive, but with some important differences relative to our ﬁndings on the overall size
of government.
15 As Table 13 shows, the post-election cycle in presidential regimes can be
detected in only somespeciﬁcations and estimation methods. On theotherhand, parliamentary
regimes now display a statistically signiﬁcant pre-election cycle in this component of spending
(about 0.2 percent of GDP), which continues in the post-election year. But this hike in
social security spending is present only under proportional elections. Although the estimates
are not entirely stable across samples and estimation methods, our results suggest quite a
subtle pattern. In presidential regimes, spending on social security falls after the elections,
as painful adjustments seem to be delayed. In parliamentary regimes, on the other hand,
program expansions seem to take place during election years, although only in countries
with proportional elections. In proportional parliamentary regimes favors granted during the
electoral campaign are sustained after the elections.
We ﬁnd these results intriguing: without taking explicit account of electoral rules and
politicalregimes, wewouldnothavediscoveredthesesystematicpatternsinthedata. Agreater
reliance on social-security spending around election time in parliamentary and proportional
s y s t e m si sp e r h a p sp l a u s i b l ei f–a si nt h et h e o r yd i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n2–p o l i t i c i a n si n d e e d
have greater overall incentives to use broad programs for seeking electoral support in those
systems. But it remains to work out the details – and auxiliary predictions – of such a theory.
6. Conclusion
Do political institutions shape economic policy? Our empirical results, summarized
in Table 14, strongly suggest that the answer is yes. Several of these empirical regularities
15 When estimating by SUR, the SSW/GDP equation is jointly estimated with the corresponding equation
on the size of government.37
a r ei nl i n ew i t ht h eﬁrst wave of theory discussed in Section 2. In particular, as predicted,
presidential regimes have smaller governments, while majoritarian elections lead to smaller
welfare programs.
But other ﬁndings still await a satisfactory theoretical explanation. A puzzling but
robust feature of the data is that the cyclical response of aggregate spending and budget
deﬁcits is much smaller in presidential regimes and under majoritarian elections, compared to
proportional-parliamentary systems. Larger welfare programs in proportional-parliamentary
systems inducing a larger automatic reaction of government outlays to cyclical ﬂuctuations
could partly account for this ﬁnding. But this is unlikely to be the whole story. In
particular, different political constitutions seem to be associated with different ratchet effects
in government spending.
Another puzzling but robust ﬁnding concerns electoral cycles. Fiscal adjustment is
delayed until after the election, but only in presidential regimes. And social transfers tend
to grow around the election date, but only in proportional cum parliamentary systems. Why do
we observe these different patterns in countries ruled by different institutions?
These are promising ﬁrst steps in a research program, but much work remains to be
done. One direction is to reﬁne the theory of policy. To understand the cyclical reaction of
ﬁscal policy, or why ﬁscal adjustments are delayed, we need dynamic models. This theory
does not yet exist, as the existing predictions of comparative politics and economic policy
are generally drawn from static models, in which there is no role for state variables such as
government debt, or no link between current policy decisions and the future status quo.
On the policy side, we have concentrated on government spending. It would be
interesting, and certainly feasible, to study other policy instruments — such as the structure of
taxation, including trade policy — with similar methods. On the institutional side, one should
study the effect on policy of more detailed constitutional features; for instance, different types
of checks and balances, or different types of conﬁdence requirements.
This suggests another direction of research, namely reﬁned measurement of political
institutions. In some cases, such measurement will involve a mere, but time-consuming,
compilation of data from existing sources. One example would be to collect panel data for
continuous measures ofthetwo aspects of the electoral rulediscussed in Section 2: district size38
and the electoral formula. In other cases, better measures will require the collection of new
primary data. An example would be to try and ﬁnd continuous or multidimensional measures
of checks and balances in different political regimes.
16 As this may be a labor-intensive and
open-ended task, it is important to use theory as a guide.
Some econometric issues certainly need to be explored in more detail. Even with reﬁned
measurement, considerable measurement error will remain in our data. Sharper theory would
help trade off the prospective biases due to measurement and speciﬁcation errors. Sharper
hypotheses, derived from dynamic models, would also help avoid the pitfalls of estimation in
dynamic panels.
All in all, a close interplay of theory, measurement and statistical work appears essential
for making progress on the broad questions dealt with in this paper. The empirical ﬁndings
described in this paper suggest that it is worth trying.
16 Attempts to construct such measures have been made by Beck et al (1999) and Shugart and Carey (1992).DATA APPENDIX
CENTRAL:  Degree of centralization of spending, measured as the ratio between central and
general  government expenditure. Source: GFS and IFS, International Monetary Fund.
CGEXP: Central Government Expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) Source: IFS, International
Monetary Fund.
CGREV: Central Government Revenue (as a percentage of GDP) Source: IFS, International
Monetary Fund.
COLONIAL ORIGIN: Three dummy variables, COLO_UK, COLO_ES, and COLO_OTH,
for countries with colonial origins in the UK, Spain or Portugal, and other colonizers,
respectively. Source: CIA World Factbook 1998.
CONTINENTS: Four dummy variables, ASIA, AFRICA, LAAM, OECD, for different
continents or levels of development. Source: Persson and Tabellini (1999).
DEBT: Total government debt (both domestic and foreign) as a percentage of GDP. Source: IFS,
International Monetary Fund.
ELECTION: Takes value of 1 when the parliamentary/presidential election is held, 0
otherwise. When the country is considered as parliamentary we use legislative elections,
otherwise presidential elections. For elections of the legislature, only elections for the lower
or single house are considered. Partial elections that cover at least 1/3 of the total seats
available are recorded as 1. For presidential regimes, only first round elections for president
are considered. Sources: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(2000) and Inter Parliamentary Union (Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections, various issues).
Political Handbook of the World, different volumes (from 1960 to 1996) Banks (Ed.) and
Muller (Ed.);  Mackie and Rose “The International Almanac of Electoral History” Mc Millan.
GASTIL: Average of Gastil index for civil liberties and political rights. Source: Freedom
House, various years.
GGEXP: General Government Expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) Source: GFS,
International Monetary Fund.
LYH:  Real GDP Per Capita in constant dollars (international prices, base year 1985),
expressed in logs. Source: Penn World Table 5.6.  Missing data calculated from 1985 GDP
per capita and GDP per capita growth rates (Global Development Finance & World
Development Indicators).40
MAJ: Dummy variable taking value 1 if the country's electoral system in that year utilizes a
majority or plurality rule for legislative elections, 0 otherwise. Source: Inter Parliamentary
Union, various years.
OIL: Oil Price (Market Price-Petroleum, Spot US $/Barrel) avg. crude price not seasonally
adjusted. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
PRES:  Dummy variable taking a value of 1 for presidential regimes. Sources: Shugart., M.
and J. Carey (1992), “Presidents and Assemblies”, Cambridge University Press (in particular
fig 8.2); Cox, G., (1997) “Making Votes Count”, Cambridge University Press (appendix C);
Delury, G. (Ed.) (1983), World Encyclopedia of Political Systems.
PROP1564: Share of total population between 15 and 64 years of age. Source: World Saving
Database, World Bank.
PROP65:  Share of population older than 65. Source: World Saving Database, World Bank.
SSW/GDP: Central Government Expenditures on social security and welfare (as a percentage of
GDP) Source: GFS, International Monetary Fund.
SSW/GDS: Central Government Expenditures on social security and welfare (as a percentage of
GDP) divided by Central Government Current Expenditure on goods and services (as a percentage
of GDP) Source GFS, International Monetary Fund.
SURPLUS: Overall surplus (as a percentage of GDP) Source: IFS, International Monetary Fund.
TRADE:  Total trade (imports +exports) (as a percentage of GDP). Source: Global
Development Finance & World Development Indicators.
YSHOCK:  Log deviation of real GDP from its HP filtered trend. Real GDP is measured in
constant dollars (international prices, base year 1985). Source: Penn World Tables.
YTREND:  HP-filtered  trend value of real GDP (see YSHOCK).                  Table 1
                                                                                                  Summary of Theory
PRES (vs. PARL) MAJ (vs. PR)
Size −−−− −−−−  /?
Composition









NA                 Table 2
             Sample of Countries
Narrow Default Broad MAJ PRES
USA 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 1
UK 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
AUSTRIA 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
BELGIUM 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
DENMARK 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
FRANCE 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0.94 0
GERMANY 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
ITALY 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
LUXEMBOURG 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
NETHERLANDS 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
NORWAY 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
SWEDEN 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
SWITZERLAND 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 1
CANADA 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
JAPAN 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
FINLAND 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
GREECE 1975-98 1975-98  1960-98 0 0
ICELAND 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
IRELAND 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
MALTA 1988-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
PORTUGAL 1977-98 1977-98  1960-98 0 0
SPAIN 1978-98 1978-98  1960-98 0 0
TURKEY - -  1960-98 0 0
AUSTRALIA 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
NEW ZEALAND 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
ARGENTINA - 1983-98  1960-98 0 1
BOLIVIA - 1982-98  1960-98 0 1
BRAZIL - 1980-98  1960-98 0 1
CHILE 1991-98 1960-73
1989-98
 1960-98 1 1
COLOMBIA - 1960-98  1960-98 0 1
COSTA RICA 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 1
DOMINICAN RE - 1960-98  1960-98 0 1
ECUADOR - 1979-98  1960-98 0 1
EL SALVADOR - 1960-77
1986-98
 1960-98 0 1
GUATEMALA - 1960-79  1960-98 0 1
HONDURAS - 1980-98  1960-98 0 1
MEXICO - 1996-98  1960-98 0 1
NICARAGUA - -  1960-98 0 1
PARAGUAY - 1990-98  1960-98 0 1
PERU - 1981-98  1960-98 0 1
URUGUAY 1986-98 1985-98  1960-98 0 1
VENEZUELA 1971-91 1960-98  1960-98 0 1
BAHAMAS 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 0(Table 2 segue)
BARBADOS 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
BELIZE 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
ST.VINCENT&G 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
TRINIDAD&TOB 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
CYPRUS (G) 1983-98 1960-74
1980-98
 1960-98 0.31 0
ISRAEL 1960-98 1960-98  1960-98 0 0
SRI LANKA - 1960-89  1960-98 0 1
INDIA - 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
MALAYSIA - 1960-76  1960-98 1 0
NEPAL - 1981-98  1960-98 1 1
PHILIPPINES - 1985-98  1960-98 1 1
SINGAPORE - 1981-98  1960-98 1 0
THAILAND - 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
BOTSWANA 1990-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
GAMBIA - 1960-98  1960-98 1 1
MAURITIUS 1983-98 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
FIJI 1960-86 1960-87
1992-98
 1960-98 0 0
PAPUA N.GUIN 1960-86 1960-98  1960-98 1 0
 Narrow refers to countries with a Gastil index of political right less than 2. Default refers to countries with a Gastil
 index of political right less than 4. Broad refers to countries with a Gastil index of political right less than 5.Table 3a
Partial Correlations
Cross Sections




SSW/GDS 0.47 - 0.04
LYH 0.46 0.02 0.71
GASTIL - 0.60 0.04 - 0.56 - 0.73
TRADE 0.32 0.27 - 0.13 0.07 - 0.07
PROP1564 0.44 - 0.02 0.72 0.76 - 0.61 0.17
PROP65 0.56 - 0.11 0.82 0.80 - 0.71 - 0.04 0.82
CENTRAL 0.16 -0.18 -0.51 -0.47 0.34 0.47 -0.43 -0.39
PRES - 0.60 0.09 - 0.28 - 0.48 0.58 - 0.36 - 0.56 - 0.50 0.12
MAJ - 0.03 0.23 - 0.27 - 0.12 - 0.02 0.23 - 0.06 - 0.22  0.04 -0.24Table 3b
Partial Correlations
Pooled Yearly Data
CGEXP SURPLUS SSW_GDS GROWTH LYH GASTIL TRADE PROP1564 PROP65 PRES
SURPLUS - 0.41
SSW/GDS 0.47 - 0.08
GROWTH - 0.15 0.15 - 0.18
LYH 0.49 0.01 0.65 - 0.11
GASTIL - 0.46 0.08 - 0.47 0.14 - 0.59
TRADE 0.32 0.13 - 0.13 0.10 0.13 - 0.03
PROP1564 0.44 - 0.01 0.60 - 0.12 0.76 - 0.48 0.19
PROP65 0.56 - 0.08 0.79 - 0.16 0.79 - 0.59 0.02 0.78
PRES - 0.49 0.07 - 0.21 - 0.05 - 0.45 0.46 - 0.35 - 0.47 - 0.47
MAJ - 0.05 0.12 - 0.28 0.05 - 0.04 0 0.16 - 0.02 - 0.17 - 0.26Table 4
Size of Government
Cross Sections
Dep. variable Central Spending Central Revenue General Spending Central Spending


































Controls X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1
Cont.&Col. Cont.&Col. Cont.&Col. Cont.&Col. Cont.&Col. Cont.&Col.
# Obs. 1519 1445 1789 1420 1756 457 251
# Countries 59 58 61 57 60 36 53
R
2 0.54 0.64 0.64 0.71 0.72 0.84 0.73
Broad refers to the less restrictive definition of a democracy (see text).  p-values in brackets.  Boldface fonts denote significance at the 10% level.  X1   includes  the variables TRADE,  LYH,
PROP1564, PROP65  (see the text and Data Appendix). Cont. and Col. refer to two sets of dummies for continents and colonial origin, respectively  (see the Data Appendix).Table 5
Size of Government
Unobservable Common Events 1960-1998
Dep. variable Central Spending Central Revenue
Sampling Yearly Yearly Yearly Yearly
Broad



























β  ∗ (qT - q1)∗
PRES - 12.73 - 13.46 - 11.09 - 9.05 - 7.17 - 6.60
β  ∗ (qT - q1)∗
MAJ - 2.99 - 5.84 - 6.24 - 2.90 - 2.37 - 3.09
Controls X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1
# Obs. 1519 1519 1519 1871 328 1492 1836
R
2 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.91 0.88 0.87
Broad refers to the less restrictive definition of a democracy (see text).  p-values in brackets.  Boldface fonts denote significance at the 10% level. X1   includes  the variables TRADE,  LYH,  PROP156
(see the text and Data Appendix). All the equations include a set of country dummies. Table 6
Size of Central Government
Observable Economic Events 1960-1998
Dep.
Variable Spending Revenue Spending





















P∗ LAG_SIZE    - 0.29
   (.000)
   - 0.28











  - 0.04
(.040)
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P∗ YSH_POS   0.28
(.012)








Controls X2 X2 X2 X2 X2 X2
# Obs. 1475 1432 1432 1475 1472 1421
R
2 0.81 0.95 0.96 0.81
   p-values in brackets.  Boldface fonts denote  significance at the 10% level.  P and M denote interaction with the PRES and
MAJ   dummies, respectively.   X2   includes  the variables in X1 (namely TRADE,  LYH,  PROP1564, PROP65),  plus OIL and
the trend corresponding to YSHOCK  (see text and Data Appendix). R
2  in the fixed-effects regressions refers to the within
estimator.Table 7
Surplus of Government
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   (.245)
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   (.321)
  - 0.10











































Controls X3 X3 X3 X3 X3 X3
# Obs. 1047 1204 770 770 1356 911
R
2 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.65 0.74
Broad and Narrow refer to less and more restrictive definitions of a democracy (see text).  p-values in brackets.
Boldface fonts denote  significance at the 10% level. SUR estimated jointly with CGEXP and CGREV. P and M  denote
interaction with the PRES and MAJ dummies, respectively .  X3  includes the variables in X2  (namely TRADE,  LYH,
PROP1564, PROP65, OIL, the trend corresponding to YSHOCK) plus lagged size of  spending and revenues by central
government. These two variables are interacted with PRES and MAJ in columns 1-4, but not in the last two columns.
R
2  in the fixed-effects regressions refers to the within estimator.
* In the last two columns, the variable (change in) lagged DEBT is replaced by the lagged deficit (in levels) – see the
footnote in subsection 5.1.Table 8
Size of Government
Electoral Cycles 1960-1995






























  - 0.75
   (.007)
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    - 0.44
  (.041)
   - 0.12
   (.444)
    - 0.37
    (.082)
















Controls X4 X4 X4 X5 X5 X5 X5 X5
# Obs. 1350 1670 1339 1350 1670 1316 1390 1355
R
2 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96
Broad refers to the less restrictive definition of a democracy (see Table 2).   p-values in brackets.  Boldface fonts denote significance at the 10% level.   ELt  and ELt-1
are dummy variables for the election and post-election years, respectively.   X4  includes the variables in X2  minus OIL  and all  the variables (including the
interaction terms) in column 1 of Table 6,  plus a set  of  year dummies;   X5 is constructed as X4  but with lagged central revenue taking the place of  lagged central
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     (.620)
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(.429)
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Controls X6 X6 X6 X6 X6 X7
# Obs. 1003 1002 1281 1569 872 1425
R
2 0.46 0.74 0.71 0.68 0.77
Broad and Narrow refer to the less and more restrictive definitions of a democracy (see text).  p-values in brackets.  Boldface fonts denote significance at the 10% level.
ELt  and ELt-1   are dummy variables for the election and post-election years, respectively. SUR estimated together with CGEXP and CGREV.  X6  includes the variables
in X2  except OIL plus all  the variables (including the interaction terms) in Column 1 of Table 7  plus a set  of  yearly dummies;   X7 is identical to X6 except that the
lagged surplus is not included (see the text).  R
2  in the fixed-effects regressions refers to the within  estimator.Table 10
Composition of Government
Cross Sections 1972-1998



































# Obs. 901 865 1063 881 845 1040
# Countries 55 54 59 53 52 57
R
2 0.77 0.80 0.79 0.69 0.74 0.74
Broad refers to the less restrictive definition of a democracy (see text).  p-values in brackets.  Boldface fonts denote significance at the 10% level. X1   includes
the variables TRADE,  LYH,  PROP1564, PROP 65  (see the text and Data Appendix). Cont. and Col. refer to two sets of dummies for continents and colonial
origin, respectively (see the Data Appendix).Table 11
Composition of Government
Unobservable Common Events 1972-1998
Dep. variable SSW/GDP SSW/GDS

























β ∗ (qT –q1)∗
PRES
- 4.70 - 4.92 - 4.04 - 0.13 - 0.07
β ∗ (qT –q1)∗
MAJ
- 1.04 - 0.70 - 0.14 - 0.20 - 0.08
Controls X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1
# Obs. 901 901 1104 881 881 1081
R
2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95
Broad refers to the less restrictive definition of a democracy (see text).  p-values in brackets.  Boldface fonts denote significance at the 10% level. X1  includes  the
variables TRADE,  LYH,  PROP1564, PROP 65  (see the text and Appendix). All the equations include a set of country dummies.Table 12
Composition of Government
Observable Economic Events 1972-1998
Dep.
variable SSW/GDP










































































































Controls X2 X2 X2 X2 X2 X2 X2
# Obs. 847 847 616 1031 789 578 953
R
2 0.77 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.05 0.05 0.03
Broad refers to the less restrictive definition of a democracy (see Table 2). SUR is jointly estimated    with CGEXP.  p-values in
brackets.Boldface fonts denote significance at the 10% level.  P  and M denote interaction with the PRES and   MAJ    dummies,
respectively.  X2   includes  the same variables as X1 (namely TRADE,  LYH,  PROP1564, PROP65),  plus OIL and the income trend
corresponding to YSHOCK.  R
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     -  0.04
       (.761)
      -  0.06
       (.742)
- 0.15
(.046)
Controls X8 X8 X8 X8 X8 X8 X9
# Obs. 806 806 587 463 751 550 805
R
2 0.80 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.18 0.21
Broad refers to the less restrictive definition of a democracy (see Table 2).   p-values in brackets.  Boldface fonts denote significance at the 10% level.  SUR  regression is estimated ointly
with CGEXP.  ELt  and ELt-1   are dummy variables for the election and post-election years, respectively.  X8  includes the same variables as X2  plus all  the variables (including
theinteraction terms) in column 1 of Table 12  except  OIL, plus a set of  yearly dummies;  X9  includes the same  variables as X8  except the lagged dependent variable.  R
2  in the fixed-
effects regression (column 1)  refers to the within estimator.Table 14
Summary of Results
PRES (vs. PARL) MAJ (vs. PR)
Evidence Theory Evidence Theory
Size −−−−− −−−−  / 0 −  / ?
Composition
(welfare spending)
−−−−  / 0 −− −−−−
Electoral cycle + / −−−− NA 0 + / ?
Reaction to shocks −−−− NA −−−− NAFigure 1
Political Institutions 1995
PRES = 1
MAJ   = 1
PRES = 1
MAJ   = 0
PRES = 0
MAJ   = 1
PRES = 0
MAJ   = 0                                              Figure 2
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